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Comments
Salvaging the Term “Suitor”: How the
Declaratory Judgment Act Has
Commandeered Congressional Intent
Brett P. Hargaden∗

“I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor, ever yet imagined
by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of [its]
constitution.” – Thomas Jefferson1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario. An experienced mariner
captains a twenty-five-foot fishing vessel off the east coast of
Florida for recreational fishing purposes. Hoping to catch a variety
of pelagic species that are commonly found off the southeast coast
of the continental United States, the captain must venture out
beyond the sight of land to the bright blue waters of the Gulf
Stream.2 To protect his investment in the vessel, he purchases a
∗ Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2017; B.B.A.,
Stetson University, 2014. For my parents, Patrick and Alison Hargaden.
Without your constant guidance and support, this would not be possible.
Thank you Professor Jonathon Gutoff, William Burnham, and Casey
Charkowick, for your time and effort. Finally, thank you Cayman Calabro, for
being supportive and understanding through the writing process. I could not
have done this without you.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 266, 266–70 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
2. See Offshore Fishing, FLORIDA GO FISHING, http://www.florida
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marine insurance policy. His policy is comprehensive, in that it
covers the value of the vessel and any liability arising from its use.3
In order to offer affordable insurance rates to its customers, the
insurance company includes specific provisions in the agreement
that prohibit certain behavior, minimizing the chance of accidents
or incidents that would result in an insurance claim.4 One of these
provisions, generally called a “navigational warranty,” requires the
captain to stay within a certain geographical area or else forfeit
coverage.5 In this case, the captain is required to stay within thirtyfive nautical miles of land at all times, which is acceptable to the
angler because his normal grounds are only ten to twenty nautical
miles offshore.6
One day, however, the captain is out thirty nautical miles
chasing a large school of fish when the vessel’s entire electronic
system fails. A large storm unexpectedly comes through the area;
without any means of propulsion, the boat drifts offshore another
fifteen to twenty nautical miles, going well beyond the geographical
limit outlined in his insurance policy. Unfortunately, the vessel
begins to take on water and eventually goes down. The captain is
gofishing.com/fishing-offshore.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2017). Target species
include, but are not limited to, dolphin (mahi-mahi), tuna, wahoo, and sailfish.
See id.
3. The portion of the insurance policy that covers damage to the vessel
itself is called hull insurance. F.D. ROSE, MARINE INSURANCE: LAW AND
PRACTICE 331 (2d ed. 2012). The portion that covers any liability resulting from
an accident while the vessel is in use is called collision liability insurance or a
“running down clause.” See id.
4. See BARIS SOYER, WARRANTIES IN MARINE INSURANCE 3 (2d ed. 2006)
(“Accordingly, from the insurer’s point of view, the extent of the risk is crucial,
as his liability will largely depend on it. The warranties incorporated into the
contract play an essential role in assessing the risk. For example, a warranty
to the effect that the insured vessel will not navigate in a certain area gives an
idea to the insurer about the extent of the risk he has agreed to provide cover
for.”).
5. See id. at 24–25 (“It is the general understanding of the assured and
insurer that the ship may navigate in any navigable waters, unless there are
contrary restrictions in the policy . . . . [A] navigation (locality) warrant[y]
restrict[s] the movement and operation of the insured vessel . . . . [T]he assured
undertakes either that the insured vessel will navigate within the confines of
a specific area, or she will not navigate in specific waters or beyond a specific
point.”).
6. “On salt water, distances are measured in nautical miles, a unit about
1/7th longer than the land or statute mile . . . . The international nautical mile
is slightly more than 6076 feet; the statute mile used on shore and fresh water
bodies is 5280 feet.” ELBERT S. MALONEY, CHAPMAN PILOTING: SEAMANSHIP AND
SMALL BOAT HANDLING 11 (55th ed. 1981).
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fortunate enough to transmit a distress signal, and the U.S. Coast
Guard later rescues him.
Months later, the captain files a claim with his insurance
company for the value of his vessel. After discovering where the
vessel sank, the insurance company refuses to pay the claim,
asserting that the breach of the navigational warranty voids the
captain’s coverage.7 Before the captain’s attorney can file a
complaint in state court, the insurance company files a declaratory
judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Florida. The captain’s attorney explains to him that because this
action is in federal court, he will not have the opportunity to argue
his case in front of a jury of his peers as he had hoped. His attorney
explains that, instead of a jury making the factual findings in the
case, one federal judge will take on the role of the fact-finder and
make all of the decisions in that regard. Can the captain’s attorney
contest this trial format, and demand a trial by jury?
Marine insurance contracts undoubtedly fall within the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts under Article III, Section
II of the U.S. Constitution, as supplemented by the relevant
statutory grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).8 These two provisions, taken
together, have given rise to a unique and unsettled area of
jurisdictional law. One difficult concept that constantly frustrates
federal courts attempting to resolve these novel issues of maritime
law is the relationship between other constitutional and statutory
provisions of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, such as the
Declaratory Judgment Act,9 and the effect these provisions might
have on the practical procedural consequences of a case, such as the
right to a jury trial, when cases can be heard both “in admiralty”
7. See SOYER, supra note 4, at 133 (“[E]xact compliance doctrine”
requires that “the obligation undertaken by a marine warranty must be exactly
complied with . . . .”).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . .”); New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co.
v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 26 (1870) (“[T]he true criterion is the nature and subjectmatter of the contract, as whether it was a maritime contract, having reference
to maritime service or maritime transactions.”); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313 (1955) (“Since the insurance policy here sued
on is a maritime contract the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution brings it
within federal jurisdiction.”).
9. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201–2202 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254).
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and “at law.” This Comment will argue that, when an insurance
company brings a declaratory judgment action against a client
regarding the existence of coverage and the insured party demands
a jury trial during the proceeding, the court should ultimately allow
the insured party to have a jury trial on all factual issues of the
case.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
When the “admiralty and maritime” clause was included in
Article III Section II of the U.S. Constitution, but prior to the
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, many believed that parties
bringing an action involving admiralty and maritime claims would
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.10
Stated another way, the only courts that could hear cases of this
subject matter were federal admiralty courts. However, we know
today that aggrieved parties that have claims satisfying the
judicially created jurisdictional hurdles of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)11 now
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original
Understandings and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty
Jurisdiction: A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361, 383-84
(1999) (“If the federal admiralty were not thought to have exclusive jurisdiction
over certain private law admiralty matters, some parties should have
continued to litigate admiralty disputes in the appropriate state courts. This
did not happen.”); see Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443
(2001) (“Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution vests federal courts
with jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Section
9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 codified this grant of exclusive original
jurisdiction, but ‘sav[ed] to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law
remedy, where the common law is competent to give it’”) (citations omitted).
11. There are two jurisdictional hurdles for tort actions brought “in
admiralty.” The first is the “locus” requirement. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 30101
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–254) (“The admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States extends to and includes cases of injury or
damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even
though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land.”). Section 30101
extends the traditional “rule of locality in cases of marine torts” described in
The Plymouth, which held that “the wrong and injury complained of must have
been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or, at least, the
substance and consummation of the same must have taken place upon these
waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction.” See id.; 70 U.S. 20, 34-35
(1865). Originally, courts had difficultly determining which waters were
“navigable” under the locus requirement. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557,
563 (1870) (“Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used,
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have a variety of avenues when deciding where to bring their claims
based on a particular provision of § 1333(1), famously titled the
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause.12
The “Savings-to-Suitors” clause allows claimants to bring
maritime actions in state courts, subject to certain exceptions.13
The clause also allows claimants to bring maritime actions “at law”
in federal district courts under an alternative basis of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction, typically § 1332 diversity jurisdiction14
or § 1331 federal question jurisdiction.15 However, if a claimant
chooses to bring a maritime action in a federal district court under
or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water.”). Likewise, courts have
recently struggled to define the term “vessel” under the Act. See Lozman v.
City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2013) (“[I]n our view a structure
does not fall within the scope of [the] statutory phrase [defining a vessel] unless
a reasonable observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and
activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people
or things over water.”). The second jurisdictional hurdle is the “nexus”
requirement; however, it is still unclear if nexus is required in cases involving
accidents on the “high seas.” See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995) (“A court, first, must ‘assess the
general features of the type of incident involved’ to determine whether the
incident has ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Second,
a court must determine whether ‘the general character’ of the ‘activity giving
rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity.’” (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363-65, 364 n.2 (1990)). There
is only one test for maritime contract jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dunham, 78 U.S.
at 26 (“[T]he true criterion is the nature and subject-matter of the contract, as
whether it was a maritime contract, having reference to maritime service or
maritime transactions.”).
12. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254)
(“[S]aving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled.”); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 362 (1959).
“What the drafters of the Judiciary Act intended in creating the saving to
suitors clause is not entirely clear and has been the subject of some debate.”
Lewis, 531 U.S. at 444 (citing Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original Understandings
and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to
Professor Casto, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361, 387-90 (1999))
13. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. at 431 (precluding California state
court from allowing plaintiff to bring action in rem against vessel and having
vessel arrested); Phillips v. Sea Tow/Sea Spill of Savannah, 578 S.E.2d 846,
851 (Ga. 2003) (precluding a claim for salvage even though the suit was in
personam as opposed to in rem); Lewis, 531 U.S. at 453 (explaining that
petitions for limitation of liability are reserved for federal district courts).
14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Westlaw).
15. Id. § 1331; see Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239,
245–46 (1942).

458 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:453
a basis of federal subject-matter jurisdiction other than § 1333(1),
then the plaintiff must satisfy the general requirements of that
specific statutory provision. Examples of these statutory provisions
include § 1332 diversity jurisdiction, which requires complete
diversity among the parties and satisfaction of the amount in
controversy requirement,16 § 1331 federal question jurisdiction,
which requires a well-pleaded complaint.17
The “Saving-to-Suitors” clause of § 1333(1) provides concurrent
jurisdiction between federal district courts sitting “in admiralty,”
federal district courts “at law,” and state courts.18 That is, the
clause allows a plaintiff to choose between three different forums
when bringing a claim: a federal district court sitting “in
admiralty,” a federal district court “at law,” or the general
jurisdiction of any state court. There are many benefits and
consequences for each choice of forum, and a plaintiff must consider
those before making this decision.
B. “Hybrid Cases”
The “Saving-to-Suitors” clause routinely causes procedural
conflicts among federal district courts in what have been described
as “hybrid cases.”19 “Hybrid cases” are those where the plaintiff
16. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267–68 (1806) (creating the
“complete diversity rule”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Westlaw) (“[W]here the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs . . . .”).
17. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)
(“[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only
when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based
upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges
some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is
invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States.”).
18. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 441 (1847) (“[T]he courts of common
law may have concurrent jurisdiction in a case with the admiralty.”). A case
has “concurrent subject matter jurisdiction” when the case satisfies the subject
matter jurisdiction of both the state and federal court. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 166 (3d ed. 2012).
19. See Lily Kurland, Note, A Trying Balance: Determining the Trier of
Fact in Hybrid Admiralty-Civil Cases, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1293, 1320 (2013);
see also Reliance Nat. Ins. Co. (Eur.) v. Hanover, 222 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115–16
(D. Mass. 2002) (“When a claim brought in admiralty triggers a compulsory
counterclaim for which a defendant (plaintiff-in-counterclaim) requests a jury
trial, the result is a ‘hybrid’ proceeding. While there is no uniform answer to
the question as to how a court is to proceed in a hybrid case, it is required to do
its utmost to protect a party’s right to a jury trial.”) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)).
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has filed an action under the federal district court’s admiralty
jurisdiction set out in § 1333(1) and has designated the case as an
admiralty claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h).20 After
the plaintiff files a claim “in admiralty,” the named defendant in
the action files a counterclaim. However, instead of invoking
admiralty jurisdiction, the defendant invokes diversity jurisdiction
or federal question jurisdiction as an independent basis of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. This decision allows the defendant in
the action to demand a jury trial on the “legal” claim.21 The
ultimate issue in these “hybrid cases” is how the district court
should rule on the defendant’s demand for a jury trial on the “legal”
counterclaims.22 The conflicting interests that the district court
must consider are the defendant’s Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial23 and the plaintiff’s preference for a bench trial, a
preference that is consistent with a customary mode of trial
procedure in admiralty law.24

20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h) (“If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on
some other ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or
maritime claim for purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), and 82 and the Supplemental
Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions. A claim
cognizable only in the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction is an admiralty or
maritime claim for those purposes, whether or not so designated.”). This
specific rule is a sub-section of Rule 9, which requires heightened specificity in
pleadings for certain causes of action; its purpose is to identify claims that have
multiple bases of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, described above as
“hybrid cases.” See id.
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) (“The right of trial by jury as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal
statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.”).
22. Typically, the plaintiff in the case will move to strike the defendant’s
jury demand.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
24. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 460 (1847) (holding that the
Seventh Amendment does not apply to cases “in admiralty”); Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Traditionally . . .
admiralty courts and courts of equity did not rely on juries.”); Koch Fuels, Inc.
v. Cargo of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 1983)
(“Ordinarily, admiralty claims are tried to the court.”); but see Wilmington
Trust v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Hawaii, 934 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.
1991) (“Regardless of whether a claim is cognizable in admiralty, the right to
a jury trial on such claim is preserved despite plaintiff’s election to proceed in
admiralty. This court has acknowledged that the non-jury component of
admiralty jurisdiction must give way to the seventh amendment”).
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A federal district court has three alternatives when the
plaintiff moves to strike the defendant’s demand for a jury trial in
the above situation: (1) the court can designate the plaintiff’s Rule
9(h) as covering the entire case and hold a bench trial on both
claims; (2) the court can sever the claims, holding a bench trial for
the plaintiff’s “admiralty claim” and jury trial for the defendant’s
“legal claim”; or (3) the court can hold the defendant’s Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial supersedes the Rule 9(h)
designation and hold a jury trial on both claims. This Comment
will go beyond the typical “hybrid case,” analyzing a narrower and
more specific class of cases that are a sub-category of the traditional
“hybrid cases,” and ultimately conclude that, in these specific
procedural scenarios described below, a court should grant the
defendant’s jury demand on all relevant claims.
C. Declaratory Judgment Actions
The Seventh Amendment issue becomes even more
complicated when the plaintiff’s action is for declaratory relief, as
opposed to actual damages. The prime example, which is the focus
of this Comment, is that of an insurance company (plaintiff-insurer)
suing one of its insured clients (defendant-insured). These cases
involve mixed questions of law and fact and are usually brought to
obtain a federal district court’s declaration as to the insurance
company’s liability, define the scope of the policy in question, or
both. Typically, a case such as this would begin with the insured
filing a claim against their policy based upon an accident or issue
that would ultimately invoke a federal district court’s jurisdiction
through § 1333(1) admiralty jurisdiction and § 1331 federal
question or § 1332 diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.25 After the
insurer denies the insurance claim, the insured will prepare to file
suit to challenge the insurance company’s decision based on a
breach of contract theory of liability. However, if the insurance
company files a declaratory action in federal court under § 1333(1),
seeking a determination of overall liability and/or the scope of
25. Under the hypothetical situation, the sinking of the recreational
fishing vessel would be the accident invoking both § 1333(1) admiralty
jurisdiction, as well as § 1332 diversity jurisdiction. It is not, however,
required that another independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction,
other than § 1333(1), exist for this situation to arise. The accident will almost
always fall into the state’s general jurisdiction, and is always an alternative
avenue for the plaintiff.
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coverage under the marine insurance contract, before the insured
party can bring the breach of contract claim, the entire nature of
the case is altered.
The purpose of this declaratory action is two-fold: first, the
insurance company wants to quickly resolve this dispute; and
second, if the insurance company sues “in admiralty,” it can elect to
proceed without a jury trial.26 After the plaintiff-insurer files suit,
the defendant-insured is forced to file a compulsory counterclaim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a).27 The defendantinsured would then demand a jury trial on the compulsory
counterclaim, asserting an independent basis of federal subject
matter jurisdiction and the right to seek that remedy under the
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause.28
This Comment will argue that, where a plaintiff-insurer brings
a declaratory judgment action in a federal district court under 28
U.S.C. § 1333(1)29 and under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure30 to determine the existence or scope of coverage under
a policy of marine insurance, and the defendant-insured files a
counterclaim directly related to the ultimate issue in the plaintiff’s
initial action, the defendant should have a right to a jury trial under
the Seventh Amendment and the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause of §
1333(1).
Part A of this Comment will provide a general overview of the
relevant authority on this particular issue. Part B will discuss the
procedural consequences following the enactment of the
Declaratory Judgment Act and the device’s effect on admiralty law.
Part C will focus on the intended purpose of the “Saving-to-Suitors”
clause. Part D will examine how the doctrine of abstention
influences the right to a jury trial in declaratory judgment cases.

26. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h)(1) (“If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on
some other ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or
maritime claim for purposes of Rule[] . . . 38(e) . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e)
(“These rules do not create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim that is an
admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h).”).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (“A pleading must state as a counterclaim any
claim that—at the time of its service—the pleader has against an opposing
party if the claim: (A) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim . . . .”).
28. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254).
29. Id.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h).
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Finally, Part E will explain the ramifications of precluding a jury
trial in these cases and will argue the actual intent of insurance
companies when moving to strike defendant-insureds’ jury
demands.
III. INSURED’S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

A. Circuit-Split Overview
Only two circuits, the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit,
have directly addressed the issue of whether a defendant-insured
has a right to a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action brought
by a plaintiff-insurer. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v.
Lago Canyon, Inc. affirmed the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s motion
to strike opposing counsel’s demand for a jury trial.31 In this case,
the defendant-insured owned a yacht that partially sank while
undergoing engine repairs, causing damage to the vessel in excess
of $1.2 million.32 The defendant-insured subsequently filed a
damage claim with the plaintiff-insurer under a marine insurance
policy.33 The plaintiff-insurer filed a declaratory judgment action,
asserting that it was not liable for the damage because of a
corroding part; corrosion was excluded under the policy if found to
be the cause of the damage.34 The district court granted the
plaintiff-insurer’s motion to strike the defendant-insured’s jury
demand.35 The defendant-insured appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing, in part, that the
district court erred in granting the plaintiff-insurer’s motion to
strike.36
The Eleventh Circuit focused on Fifth Circuit precedent in
Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., where the court
31. 561 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009).
32. Id. at 1883.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1183–84.
35. Id. at 1185 (“The district court concluded that St. Paul’s Rule 9(h)
designation of its marine insurance claim as an admiralty claim trumped Lago
Canyon’s jury-trial right on its breach-of-contract counterclaim where Lago
Canyon’s counterclaim arose out of the same operative facts and same Marine
Policy as St. Paul’s claim. The district court recognized that there was a split
of authority on this issue but concluded the binding precedent . . . that both
claims be tried by the court.”).
36. Id. at 1183.
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held that in a “hybrid action” involving multiple jurisdictional
bases, the defendant-insurer’s counterclaim “at law” cannot
override the plaintiff-insured’s Rule 9(h) designation to proceed “in
admiralty” without a jury trial when both parties file damages
claims.37 The Fifth Circuit properly concluded that in a single
action, when two claims for damages are brought—one by the
plaintiff-insurer invoking admiralty jurisdiction and the other by
the defendant-insured invoking the court’s civil jurisdiction—the
plaintiff-insurer’s choice to designate the claim “in admiralty”
under Rule 9(h) without a jury trial prevails over the defendantinsured’s demand for a jury trial.38 This conclusion, however, does
not address a very different situation where there are not two
claims brought for damages, but one claim brought for declaratory
relief and one claim brought for damages.
In the former situation addressed in Harrison, the plaintiffinsurer has a legitimate claim for damages that can be brought
without the use of a statutory vehicle.39 In the latter situation,
however, the plaintiff-insurer would have no claim against the
defendant-insured without the statutory vehicle, and traditionally
would have to wait for the defendant to bring the claim in the court
of his or her choosing under the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause.40 The
defendant-insured in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. raised
this argument;41 but the court held that the difference in
jurisdictional basis, as opposed to the distinction in the type of relief
sought by the plaintiff, required the court to follow Harrison as
opposed to other Supreme Court precedent addressing declaratory
judgment actions.42 This distinction is the critical flaw in the
court’s reasoning, as both parties in Harrison had a legitimate
claim for damages against one another.43 Where both parties have
37. See 577 F.2d 968, 986–88 (5th Cir. 1978).
38. See id. It is crucial to recognize that the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion
should be strictly limited to those situations involving “hybrid cases,” as
opposed to the situation presented in this Comment involving declaratory
judgments.
39. See id.
40. Going back to the hypothetical posed, without the enactment of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, the captain’s insurance company would have no
claim against him until he filed a breach of contract claim.
41. See 561 F.3d at 1188 (“[Defendant-insured] contends that Harrison
should not apply because [plaintiff-insurer] brought a declaratory judgment
action, whereas the plaintiff in Harrison brought a suit for damages.”).
42. See id. at 1188–89.
43. See Harrison, 577 F.2d at 986–87.
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a valid claim for damages, it is understandable why a district court
would hold that the Rule 9(h) designation supersedes a demand for
a jury trial, as both parties could be considered a “suitor” under the
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause.44 However, where only one party has a
valid claim for damages, and the other party files a claim for a
declaratory judgment action, it seems that only the party that has
a valid claim for damages should be considered the “suitor” under
the clause; it is that party’s choice that should supersede over the
other party taking advantage of the statutory vehicle.
There are also many federal district courts that have directly
addressed this issue, holding that the defendant-insured’s right to
a jury trial is precluded in cases where the plaintiff-insurer brings
a declaratory judgment action “in admiralty.”45 These decisions are
consistent with a traditional characteristic of admiralty law: the
presiding judge is charged with making findings of fact and
determinations of law, as opposed to a jury finding the facts of the
case and limiting the judge’s role to making conclusions of law.46
One such decision is St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v.
Holiday Fair, Inc., where the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the defendant-insured does
not have a right to a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action.47
Interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(e)48 and
distinguishing prior United States Supreme Court precedent, the
district court determined that the plaintiff-insurer’s “right” to a
non-jury trial in admiralty cases outweighed the defendant-

44. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254).
45. See Windsor Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 158,
159 (D.N.J. 2003); Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Me. Offshore Boats, Inc., No. 0144-P-H, 2001 WL 484040 (D. Me. May 7, 2001); Underwriters Subscribing to
Certificate of Ins. No. 98B1/800 v. On the Loose Travel, Inc., No. 99-0200-Civ.,
1999 WL 694212 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 1999); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
v. Holiday Fair, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5707 (TPG), 1996 WL 148350, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996); Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Hansen, 125 F.R.D. 5, 6–
9 (D. Mass. 1988); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Banana Services, Inc., No. 84-1508-Civ.,
1984 WL 1888 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 1984); Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Bauer Dredging Co., 74 F.R.D. 461, 461–62 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Ins. Co. of Pa.
v. Amaral, 44 F.R.D. 45, 47 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
46. See, e.g., Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir.
1995) (“Traditionally . . . admiralty courts and courts of equity did not rely on
juries.”).
47. 1996 WL 148350, at *1–2.
48. “These rules do not create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim
that is an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h).” FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e).
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insured’s request for a jury trial.49
The district court’s reasoning seems to indicate that the proper
analysis is based on a balancing of the parties’ interests, specifically
the plaintiff-insurer’s preference for a bench trial and the
defendant-insured’s right to a jury trial. Although the Seventh
Amendment is not directly implicated because the case technically
arises “in admiralty,” it can be argued that the defendant-insured’s
right to a jury trial should be given sufficient weight to tip the scales
in favor of allowing a jury trial in these specific declaratory
judgment actions. This argument also rests upon the notion that
the traditional characteristic of admiralty law involving bench
trials has no constitutional basis and should be limited as such
when new circumstances arise.50 Moreover, the district court also
asserted that a marine insurance company’s use of a declaratory
judgment action was “not a mere race to the courthouse,” but
instead “is a normal and orderly procedure.”51 Without any
justification or reasoning following this statement, it is hard to
determine why the court made this conclusion, for it seems the use
of a declaratory judgment action in this situation is just that: a race
to the courthouse in order to preclude the defendant-insured from
obtaining a jury trial.52
One federal appellate court and a number of federal district
courts, however, have denied a plaintiff-insurer’s motion to strike a
defendant-insured’s demand for a jury trial, concluding that the
defendant-insured’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
supersedes a customary feature of admiralty procedure.53 The
49. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 1996 WL 148350, at *2 (“It would seem
to be a reasonable application of these principles to hold that [the plaintiffinsurer’s] right to a non-jury trial based on its admiralty claim outweighs [the
defendant-insured’s] request for a jury trial based on its counterclaim.”).
50. See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“While this
Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in
admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the
Constitution forbids them.” (footnotes omitted)).
51. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 1996 WL 148350, at *2.
52. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Indus. Terminal & Salvage Co., No. 05CV1142,
2005 WL 2647950, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2005) (“If this Court were to strike
[the defendant-insured’s] jury demand based upon the fact that [the plaintiffinsurer] was the ‘first to file’ under this factual scenario, the Court would
essentially be encouraging parties to engage in an inauspicious race to the
courthouse.”).
53. See In re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 2007);
Cont’l Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2647950, at *1 (“Ordinarily, the normal procedure in
a case where an insurer has denied insurance coverage would be for the
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in In re
Lockheed Martin Corporation held that the defendant-insured had
a right to a jury trial, explaining that “the Seventh Amendment
applies to admiralty claims that are tried ‘at law’ by way of the
Saving-to-Suitors clause.”54 In this case, the defendant-insured
owned a vessel that was damaged at sea and submitted a claim with
the plaintiff-insurer as a result of the significant damage.55 The
plaintiff-insurer filed a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether the claim was time-barred under the marine insurance
policy, and designated the claim as one “in admiralty” under Rule
9(h) to preclude a jury trial.56 The defendant-insured filed a
counterclaim seeking payment for damage to the ship, requesting a
jury trial.57
Overruling the judgment of the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, the Fourth Circuit focused on two
provisions critical to the jury-trial determination: the Seventh
Amendment and the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause.58 The court noted
that there is no constitutional prohibition of jury trials in cases
insured to file a breach of contract action, and thus, the insured would be the
plaintiff in the action. In this case, the reverse has occurred. Nonetheless, this
Court will take this opportunity to realign the parties and their respective
claims in the interests of fairness and comprehensibility.”); Reliance Nat. Ins.
Co. (Eur.) v. Hanover, 222 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115–16 (D. Mass. 2002) (“While
there is no uniform answer to the question as to how a court is to proceed in a
hybrid case, it is required to do its utmost to protect a party’s right to a jury
trial.”); Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. J. Shree Corp., 184 F.R.D. 258, 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
54. 503 F.3d at 356; see also Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d
148, 153 (4th Cir. 1995) (“While trials to different factfinders may be required
in actions having law and equity components because of the jury’s inability to
fashion equitable remedies, that result is not compelled when claims at law
and in admiralty, arising out of a single accident, are combined in a single
complaint for damages. To render the trial process in that particular
circumstance less cumbersome, confusing, and time-consuming, the Supreme
Court has adopted the pragmatic procedural rule that both the admiralty claim
and the law claim be decided by the jury so that ‘[o]nly one trier of fact [is] used
for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split
conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments.’” (quoting
Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 21 (1963)).
55. In re Lockheed Martin, 503 F.3d at 352. The policy claim exceeded
$2.6 million in damage. Id. at 353.
56. Id. (“On July 22, 2005, [plaintiff-insurer] preemptively filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that [defendant-insured’s]
claims were time-barred under the policy.” (emphasis added)).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 354.

2017]

SALVAGING THE TERM “SUITOR”

467

tried “in admiralty,” and further held that the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial is not “inapplicable” to the determination of
these cases.59 The court reasoned that the “Seventh Amendment
applies to admiralty claims that are tried ‘at law’ by way of the
saving-to-suitors clause,”60 and that to allow the plaintiff-insurer
the ability to strip the defendant-insured of the right to a jury trial
is “inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial must be preserved
‘wherever possible.’”61
The court made the proper inquiry when determining whether
to strike the defendant-insured’s demand for a jury trial; it ignored
the alignment of the parties under the declaratory judgment action
and “instead look[ed] to how the action otherwise would have
proceeded.”62 The court concluded that the defendant-insured
would have had the right under the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause to
proceed with the claim “at law” and successfully demand a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment.63 It boldly but correctly asserted
that “it is an oversimplification to say that the Seventh Amendment
does not apply in admiralty.”64 Finally, the court recognized that
the Seventh Amendment does not apply to an “admiralty claim,”
but could be applicable to certain circumstances where concurrent
jurisdiction exists.65 The plaintiff-insurer petitioned for Supreme
Court review in this case, but the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.66
B. The Declaratory Judgment Act and Subsequent Case-Law
With the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act67 came
59. Id. at 354, 356 (“The Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial,
however, applies only to cases at law, a category that does not include maritime
cases . . . . If an admiralty claim is tried ‘at law,’ the claim nonetheless remains
an admiralty claim, and substantive admiralty law governs the disposition of
the claim. That such claims remain admiralty claims, however, does not mean
that the Seventh Amendment is inapplicable.” (citations omitted)).
60. Id. at 356.
61. Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
62. See id. at 359.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 553 U.S. 1017 (2008) (No. 07-948).
67. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316) (“In a case
of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States,
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many questions regarding the procedural consequences it would
have on cases, most notably the right to a jury trial. When
interpreting the original version of the Act, many appellate courts
had to decide how this new device would affect a party’s
constitutional right to a jury trial on legal claims, when the
opposing party brought a declaratory action without a demand for
a jury trial. The initial determination was that the declaratory
action itself was neither legal nor equitable, and that by bringing
this type of action the plaintiff could not preclude the defendant
from obtaining a trial by jury.68 In 1959, the United States
Supreme Court solidified these lower-court decisions in Beacon
Theaters Inc. v. Westover, where the Court held that the right to a
jury trial in a declaratory judgment action depends on whether
there would have been a right to a jury trial had the action
proceeded without the declaratory judgment vehicle.69 The Court
concluded that the analysis should focus on whether or not the
defendant in the declaratory judgment action would have a
constitutional right to a jury trial on the counterclaim had the
parties been properly aligned.70 Beacon Theaters and its
predecessors seemed to, at the very least, indicate that a
declaratory judgment action by itself should not deprive a
defendant-insured of his or her right to a jury trial.71
The critical question, which has been the subject of much legal

upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”).
68. See Hargrove v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225, 228 (10th Cir. 1942)
(“Whether the issues are tendered by suit under the Declaratory Judgment
Act, or as a defense to an action to recover on the policies, the rights of the
parties are the same and the rule with respect to trial by jury is the same.”).
69. 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959).
70. See id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935))
(“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care.”).
71. See Johnson v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 238 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir.
1956); Okla. Contracting Co. v. Magnolia Pipe Line Co., 195 F.2d 391, 396 (5th
Cir. 1952); Dickinson v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 147 F.2d 396,
397 (9th Cir. 1945); (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. of Ill. v. Timms &
Howard, 108 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1939); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Koch, 102
F.2d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 1939); Pac. Indem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446, 449
(9th Cir. 1939).
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scholarly debate in admiralty law, is whether the focus of the
analysis should be centered on the subject-matter of the case (being
a maritime cause of action versus a non-maritime cause of action),
or whether it should revolve around the type of relief sought (action
seeking declaratory relief as opposed to a traditional lawsuit
seeking damages).72 In this respect, it is important to consider the
distinction made earlier in this Comment73 and note this author’s
proposition: there could be a different outcome regarding the right
to a jury trial in the broader category of cases described as “hybrid
cases” than those where the plaintiff-insurer brings a declaratory
judgment action. As mentioned earlier, “hybrid cases” are those
where the plaintiff brings a traditional cause of action against the
defendant invoking the federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction. The
defendant then brings a counterclaim,74 but wishes to invoke
another basis of federal subject-matter jurisdiction so that the
defendant can demand a jury trial for the “legal” counterclaim. The
significance of the declaratory action is highlighted when you
recognize the distinction between these two situations based on the
alignment of the parties. Without the declaratory judgment
vehicle, the alignment of the parties would be reversed; this
reversal would have serious consequences on choice of forum,75
choice of subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court,76 and the
72. See generally Steven E. Goldman & Michael I. Goldman, Is the Jury
Still Out? The Controversy Over the Traditional Rule Requiring a Non-Jury
Trial in Marine Insurance Declaratory Judgment Actions in Federal Court, 41
J. MAR. L. & COM. 117 (2010) (discussing circuit split regarding whether a
plaintiff-insurer’s decision to file an admiralty claim requires a bench trial for
all claims in a case, and criticizing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Lockheed
Martin).
73. See supra Section II.C. (distinguishing “hybrid case,” where both
plaintiff and defendant bring actions for damages, and a case where only the
defendant-insured has claim for damages and the plaintiff-insurer brings a
claim for declaratory relief; only permissible because of statute).
74. The legal counterclaim in the “hybrid case” scenario could be
permissive under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b) or compulsory under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)–(b). However,
this is not the case when the plaintiff-insurer seeks declaratory relief; the
counterclaim for breach of contract is strictly compulsory because the claim
“arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A).
75. The defendant-insured would be the only party that could determine
the choice of state or federal court, based on the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause.
The plaintiff-insurer would have no claim against the defendant-insured.
76. The defendant-insured would be the only party that could choose
between suing “at law,” 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331–1332 (Westlaw through Pub. L.
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procedural consequences that follow these choices. Alternatively,
in “hybrid cases” the party alignment remains the same, as the
plaintiff is bringing an actual claim seeking damages or injunctive
relief from the defendant as opposed to a mere declaration
regarding a controversy.77
In “hybrid cases,” the argument in favor of the defendant’s
right to a jury trial is substantially weaker. In order to be
successful, the individual demanding a jury trial would have to
overcome a strong custom in admiralty law that factual
determinations are to be made by the court instead of the jury.78 In
the case of a declaratory judgment claim, the plaintiff-insurer
arguing against the defendant-insured’s right to a jury trial would
have to overcome the essential purpose of the “Saving-to-Suitors”
clause: the right of an aggrieved party to choose an alternative
forum to resolve an admiralty claim.79
C. The Purpose of the “Saving-to-Suitors” Clause
When drafting The Judiciary Act of 1789, the authors included
this provision following a declaration of exclusive federal subject
matter jurisdiction in cases of admiralty: “saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it . . . .”80 By doing so, aggrieved parties now have
the ability to bring their admiralty claim “at law” in federal court,
or in state court, so long as the remedy sought is available in that
forum.81 The legal analysis used to determine whether that remedy
No. 114–254), or “in admiralty,” id. § 1333, based on the “Saving-to-Suitors”
clause.
77. In “hybrid cases,” both parties have a claim regardless of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, so either party could make the above
determinations.
78. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 460 (1847) (holding that Seventh
Amendment does not apply to cases “in admiralty”); Vodusek v. Bayliner
Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Traditionally . . . admiralty
courts and courts of equity did not rely on juries.”); Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo
of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Ordinarily,
admiralty claims are tried to the court.”).
79. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 454 (2001)
(“Tracing the development of the clause since the Judiciary Act of 1789, it
appears that the clause was designed to protect remedies available at common
law.”).
80. Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333).
81. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411, 431 (1866) (“[The Saving-to-Suitors]
clause only saves to suitors ‘the right of a common-law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it.’ It is not a remedy in the common-law
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is available under the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause is a historical test:
whether that remedy was available in the common law courts at the
time of enactment.82 This has excluded several types of cases from
the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause, but the right to a jury trial is
recognized as provided by the common law and available to
plaintiffs today.83 When deciding whether a defendant-insured is
entitled to a jury trial in a declaratory action, it is important to ask
for whom the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause was intended. That is,
what was the authors’ purpose for allowing suits to be brought
outside the traditional admiralty courts and whom exactly would
that benefit? Obviously, this provision was included well before the
enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934.84
Before the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, parties
attempting to resolve a marine insurance dispute would always be
properly aligned. The plaintiff would be the insured party suing
the defendant insurance company for breach of contract or another
relevant cause of action. The insurance company would have no
claim against the insured party and the insurance company would
have to wait for the insured party to sue in order to resolve the
claim against the company. Because of this, only the insured party
would have the choice of forum under § 1333(1) and therefore it
would have ultimate control over certain procedural
consequences.85 When a declaratory judgment action is introduced
into this scenario, the choice of forum and the resulting
consequences following that decision are effectively stripped from
the insured party, and the insurance company has the ability to
control important aspects of the lawsuit.86 When analyzing this
courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy.” (quoting id.)).
82. See id.
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
84. Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose”: Implications of
the History of the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L.
REV. 767, 771 (2006).
85. For example, the bench trial custom of admiralty law only applies to
admiralty courts. See, e.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 460 (1847) (“But
there is no provision, as the constitution originally was, from which it can be
inferred that civil causes in admiralty were to be tried by a jury, contrary to
what the framers of the constitution knew was the mode of trial of issues of
fact in the admiralty. We confess, then, we cannot see how they are to be
embraced in the seventh amendment of the constitution, providing that in suits
at common law the trial by jury should be preserved.”).
86. These include aspects of the lawsuit that were originally designed to
be provided to suitors/plaintiffs under the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause. See
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factual situation and considering the ultimate purpose of the
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause, it would seem that the intent of
Congress in enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789 has been nullified
and rendered useless to injured parties.
In 1847, the United States Supreme Court was tasked with
determining whom in fact the word “suitors” applied when deciding
Waring v. Clark.87 The facts of this case closely resemble what has
been subsequently described as a “hybrid case;”88 and it is the
absence of procedural methods to realign the parties that makes
this decision so significant. In this case, the plaintiff brought a
claim “in admiralty” against the defendant based on a collision
between two vessels on the navigable waters of the Mississippi
River, and the plaintiff requested a bench trial.89 The defendant
demanded a jury trial on all issues, asserting that his common law
counterclaim required the Court to respect his Seventh Amendment
right even though the plaintiff brought his claim “in admiralty.”90
Deciding to the contrary, the Court concluded that “[the “Saving-toSuitors” clause] certainly could not have been intended more for the
benefit of the defendant than for the plaintiff, which would be the
case if he could at his will force the plaintiff into a common law
court . . . .”91 This holding essentially limited the defendant’s ability
to remove a case brought “in admiralty” by a plaintiff to a state
court or a federal court “at law,” simply because the defendant could
have brought the counterclaim outside of admiralty jurisdiction.92
How does one reconcile the Court’s conclusion above with the
procedural exception proposed in this Comment?
After Waring, it would seem as though the question regarding
the right to a jury trial in “hybrid cases” had been answered: the
defendant cannot nullify the plaintiff’s choice to sue in admiralty.93
This quote from the opinion, however, has also been used to argue

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 455 (2001).
87. 46 U.S. at 461 (“The saving is for the benefit of suitors, plaintiff and
defendant, when the plaintiff in a case of concurrent jurisdiction chooses to sue
in the common law courts, so giving to himself and the defendant all the
advantages which such tribunals can give to suitors in them.”).
88. See id. (“[I]n cases of concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty and common
law . . . .”).
89. Id. at 451–52.
90. Id. at 451–53.
91. Id. at 461.
92. See id.
93. See id at 460.
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that the same conclusion must apply to defendant-insureds seeking
a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action brought by an
insurance company.94 In order to analyze a case involving a
declaratory judgment properly, it is important to carefully read
Justice Wayne’s language and determine who the “defendant” is
and who the “plaintiff” is for the purposes of this analysis.95
Without the Declaratory Judgment Act, the alignment of the
parties would be proper, making the “defendant” the insurance
company and the “plaintiff” the insured party.96 Arguably, this
analysis is irrelevant, as the Act is good law and commonly used
today.97 However, if one continues to the next clause of Justice
Wayne’s opinion, while hypothetically keeping the parties in their
“proper” alignment,98 one would realize who is actually being forced
into the court not of their choice and stripped of the tactical
benefit.99
Previous courts addressing the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause have
recognized that “[o]ne of the remedies saved to suitors is the right
to a trial by jury.”100 This remedy should not be stripped of
aggrieved parties simply because of newly developed procedural
devices created by subsequent legislation. Even if the Declaratory
Judgment Act provides an avenue for plaintiff-insurers to get into
federal court, future defendant-insureds should retain the
fundamental procedural benefits they would have enjoyed absent a
declaratory judgment action. It is important to point out once again
that, without the Declaratory Judgment Act, this problem would
not arise; the aggrieved party would have ultimate control over the
forum and procedures as intended by Congress when enacting the
“Saving-to-Suitors” clause. To protect defendant-insureds from the
harsh consequences of this procedural anomaly, federal courts must
step in and create the proposed exception.

94. See e.g., Goldman & Goldman, supra note 72, at 120–23.
95. See Waring, 46 U.S. at 461.
96. See id.
97. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254).
98. By “proper,” the author means the way the parties would be aligned
without the use of a declaratory judgment action.
99. See Waring, 46 U.S. at 461.
100. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360,
(1962) (“[T]rial by jury is part of the remedy.”); In re Complaint of McAllister
Towing of Va., Inc., 999 F. Supp. 797, 799 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“One of the remedies
saved to suitors is the right to a trial by jury.”).
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D.

The Principle of Abstention and Judicial Discretion in
Declaratory Judgment Actions

Another argument in favor of specific procedural exceptions for
cases involving declaratory actions is the broad judicial discretion
provided to judges when deciding to hear declaratory actions, as
well as the principle of abstention from hearing cases in federal
court in general. The majority of federal cases that address these
principles involve parallel cases; parallel cases are those where a
plaintiff files a state court action first, and then the defendant
brings a separate action in a federal court,101 addressing the same
underlying issue as the state court action. Although the factual
scenario involving a plaintiff-insurer bringing a declaratory action
against a defendant-insured does not usually involve another state
court proceeding, the general principles apply because both
situations involve the same choice of forum option that the
defendant-insured wishes to protect.102
An excellent example of the interaction between the principle
of abstention and a declaratory judgment action, specifically in the
maritime law context, is demonstrated in the following line of cases.
In Youell v. Exxon Corporation, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiff-insurers’
declaratory judgment action, invoking the principle of
abstention.103 In this case, the defendant-insured filed an action in
a Texas state court based on losses resulting from the infamous
grounding of the Exxon Valdez off the coast of Alaska in 1989.104
The plaintiff-insurers simultaneously filed a declaratory judgment
action in federal court arising from the same circumstances

101. The separate action brought by the defendant in federal court is
usually a declaratory judgment action, as the plaintiff bringing a claim in state
court is the party typically seeking damages. See, e.g., In re Complaint of
McAllister, 999 F.Supp. at 798. Of course, there can be instances where the
defendant filing an action in federal court has a valid claim for damages
against the plaintiff who has filed a claim in state court.
102. Put another way, in both situations the main objective is to maintain
the aggrieved party’s ability to choose the forum. See supra text accompanying
note 75. By “aggrieved party,” the author again refers to the party bringing a
claim for damages as opposed to declaratory relief.
103. No. 93 Civ. 6093, 1994 WL 376068, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1994)
(“The Texas action—which will ultimately resolve all of the issues raised in the
Underwriters’ complaint—renders this suit wholly unnecessary.”).
104. Id. at *1 (“As a result of the accident, Exxon incurred expenses and
liabilities for, inter alia, cargo loss, clean up, and third-party claims.”).
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underlying the defendant-insured’s state court claim, seeking an
order to determine that they were not liable based on the policy.105
The district court concluded that under the analysis laid out by the
United States Supreme Court,106 abstention from hearing the
declaratory judgment action in this particular case was
appropriate.107 Although the district court may have relied on the
parallel state proceeding as justification for its decision, it
nonetheless held that “it is a ‘misuse of the Declaratory Judgment
Act’ to employ it to ‘gain a procedural advantage and preempt the
forum choice of the plaintiff in [a] coercive action . . . .’”108 The right
to a jury trial could have been one of the procedural advantages
contemplated by the district court; therefore, the court suggested
that any deprivation of this right should be carefully considered by
a court before deciding to hear a declaratory judgment action. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court below, focusing on the novel
determination of federal law that was underlying the parties’
controversy.109
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in Youell, the United
States Supreme Court confirmed the principle of abstention in
declaratory judgment actions in Wilton v. Seven Falls Company.110
105. Id. at *5 (“Looking to the potential for duplicative litigation, the Court
notes initially that this action . . . presents the same issues and parties present
in the Texas forum.”).
106. The Supreme Court has identified six factors a district court should
weigh in considering whether a defendant has established “exceptional
circumstances” warranting abstention: (1) whether either the federal or state
court has assumed jurisdiction over any ‘res’ or property; (2) inconvenience of
the federal forum; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which
jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether state or federal law supplies the rule of
decision; and (6) whether the state court proceeding will adequately protect the
rights of the parties. Youell, 1994 WL 376068, at *3 (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23–27 (1983); Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976)).
107. Youell, 1994 WL 376068, at *7; see Youell v. Exxon Corp., 48 F.3d 105,
107 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The district court concluded that abstention was
appropriate because (1) a parallel action was already proceeding in Texas state
court, (2) states have a strong interest in insurance regulation, and (3) the case
was controlled predominantly by state law.”).
108. Youell, 1994 WL 376068, at *6 (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Houston
Gen. Ins., 735 F. Supp. 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
109. See Youell, 48 F.3d at 113 (“This is a novel issue of federal admiralty
law, and a federal court should decide it.”).
110. 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995) (“Consistent with the nonobligatory nature
of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in the sound exercise of its

476 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:453
The defendant in Wilton filed an action in a Texas state court, which
immediately led the plaintiff to file a declaratory action in federal
court based on the same factual circumstances.111 The Court,
relying on the abstention principle laid out in Brillhart v. Excess
Insurance Company of America,112 held that, “district courts
possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain
an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit
otherwise satisfies [federal] subject matter jurisdictional
prerequisites.”113 The Court continued: “‘[t]here is . . . nothing
automatic or obligatory about the assumption of “jurisdiction” by a
federal court’ to hear a declaratory judgment action . . . . [The Act]
created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of
relief to qualifying litigants.”114 By continuously reiterating the
broad discretion afforded to district courts in this decision, the
Court seemed to recognize the serious consequences that could arise
from declaratory actions due to the inverse positioning of the
parties.115 The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment
of the Second Circuit in Youell and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of the Court’s decision in Wilton.116
An important aspect of abstention is the relationship between
the federal and state interest being decided.117 If the legal issue
being addressed is one of general maritime law, the need for
uniformity in decision-making is a strong argument in favor of
bench trials. Where state law decides the substantive issues of the
case, however, the lack of consistency that could arise from jury
trials does not pose a serious threat to the uniform nature of
admiralty law because each jurisdiction could already have
discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment
before trial or after all arguments have drawn to a close.”).
111. Id. at 279–80.
112. 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942) (“Although the District Court had jurisdiction
of the suit under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400, it
was under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction.”).
113. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282.
114. Id. at 288 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 286–90.
116. Exxon Corp. v. Youell, 516 U.S. 801 (1995). The Second Circuit,
following remand from the Supreme Court, again reversed the district court’s
decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment action. See Youell v. Exxon Corp.,
74 F.3d 373, 374 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Even when made under the more
discretionary Brillhart doctrine, a decision to abstain in this case would
constitute an abuse of discretion in light of the important federal question
presented.”).
117. See Youell v. Exxon Corp., 48 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 1995).
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significantly different positions on certain issues. The typical
argument raised by parties opposed to abstention is the novelty of
a federal issue and the need for resolution of that issue by a federal
court.118 If the question posed in the declaratory action does in fact
raise a novel question of federal law, previous federal court
decisions have declared that is, in itself, justifiable grounds for
denying a request for abstention.119
Marine insurance, however, is one area of admiralty and
maritime law that has been committed to the legislatures and
courts of the individual states.120 Because of this delegation of
authority to the states over this specific area of maritime law, it
would be very difficult for a party opposing abstention to argue that
the declaratory action raises an issue that should or must be
decided by a federal district court. Although abstention is probably
not what the defendant-insured is seeking, as the party would
probably bring the action “at law” in a federal district court anyway,
the right to a jury trial in actions involving declaratory judgments
is significantly advanced by the broad discretion federal courts have
in denying to hear the case.
E.

Bench Trials v. Jury Trials: An Ulterior Motive and the Race
to the Courthouse

When moving to strike a defendant-insured’s demand for a jury
trial, plaintiff-insurers typically argue that traditional admiralty
customs should be adhered to, and that these customs prevail over
Seventh Amendment assertions. It is worth questioning, however,
what the underlying reason is behind the enormous amount of time
and money spent by large insurance companies to have these cases
tried by the bench. It could be argued that objective, neutral judges
118. See id. at 114.
119. See id. at 111–12 (“[A] federal question of first impression must all but
demand that the federal court hear the case.”); see also Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 824 U.S. 800, 818 (1975) (“[T]he
circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of
a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are
considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for
abstention.”).
120. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313,
321 (1954) (“In the field of maritime contracts as in that of maritime torts, the
National Government has left much regulatory power in the States . . . . We,
like Congress, leave the regulation of marine insurance where it has been—
with the States.”).
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are less likely to find liability on behalf of the insurance companies,
whereas a jury is more likely to align themselves with the aggrieved
plaintiff based on the factual circumstances of the case and rule in
their favor. Moreover, once liability has been established, it could
also be argued that juries are more likely to award a higher amount
in damages based on emotion, compared to precise damages
awarded by a more conservative bench. Arguably, it is for these
collateral reasons that insurance companies have vigorously fought
to defend their preference for bench trials in admiralty cases when
using declaratory judgment actions.
If the United States Supreme Court does decide to take this
issue up on appeal in a later case, and ultimately concludes that a
defendant-insured does not have a Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial, the repercussions of such a ruling could significantly
impact the secondary, or litigation related, conduct of the two
parties. If the defendant-insured wishes to have a jury trial on a
breach of contract claim against the plaintiff-insurer, the
policyholder would have to file the cause of action immediately in
order to prevent the insurance company from filing a declaratory
action. Even if the insured party reaches the state court before the
insurance company files a declaratory judgment action, the federal
court hearing the declaratory action could decide the issue should
be resolved by the federal court without a jury, and the federal court
could stay the state court proceedings where the defendant-insured
would have a right to a jury trial. The result of such a decision
would be company guidelines among marine insurance firms to
seek declaratory relief once notified that a potential claim exists.
This “race to the courthouse” effect, inadequately dismissed by the
court in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Holiday
Fair, Inc., is a strong policy justification for permitting the use of a
jury trial in declaratory actions brought “in admiralty.”121
IV. CONCLUSION

The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by
jury in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny
and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the
whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the
judiciary. Those who passionately advocated the right to a
121.
1996).

No. 94 Civ. 5707 (TPG), 1996 WL 148350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2,
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civil jury trial did not do so because they considered the
jury a familiar procedural device that should be continued;
the concerns for the institution of jury trial that led to the
passages of the Declaration of Independence and to the
Seventh Amendment were not animated by a belief that
use of juries would lead to more efficient judicial
administration. Trial by a jury of laymen rather than by
the sovereign’s judges was important to the founders
because juries represent the layman’s common sense, the
“passional elements in our nature,” and thus keep the
administration of law in accord with the wishes and
feelings of the community.122
It is worth noting two well-accepted and fundamental
principles of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction: there is no
Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial in cases
tried “in admiralty,”123 and there is absolutely no constitutional
prohibition against holding a jury trial in cases tried “in
admiralty.”124 It is probably for this reason that this specific issue
has developed into a controversial topic of procedural law. As
mentioned earlier, the historical significance of bench trials in
courts of admiralty cannot go unrecognized. Bench trials are
essential to maintaining the uniformity of federal law, and they
prevent uninformed juries from making decisions on complex and
novel issues of maritime law.125 The situation presented, however,
is unique and includes issues that go well beyond the traditional
cases tried in admiralty courts.
Once again, the two competing interests asserted are the
defendant-insured’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and
the plaintiff-insurer’s preference for a bench trial. Although the
defendant-insured, in this case the vessel owner, does not have
grounds for asserting that there is a specific constitutional right in
courts of admiralty,126 courts must take into consideration that
without the declaratory judgment vehicle, the parties in the
hypothetical would be properly aligned and the insured party would
122. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343–44 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (J. William H. Rehnquist stressing the significance
of the civil jury trial) (citation omitted).
123. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 461 (1847).
124. See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
125. See Goldman & Goldman, supra note 72, at 139–40.
126. See Waring, 46 U.S. at 461.
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have that Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a federal
district court “at law.”127 It has already been decided that the
Declaratory Judgment Act cannot displace parties of their
constitutional rights,128 and courts must apply these historic cases
in the admiralty context to prevent parties from continually being
stripped of their right set forth in the “Saving-to-Suitors” clause of
28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
In Sphere Drake Insurance PLC v. J. Shree Corporation, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
perfectly described the significance of the right to a trial by jury
when denying a plaintiff-insurer’s motion to strike the defendantinsured’s demand for a jury trial: “[t]here is, perhaps, no concept
that is more fundamental to the American judicial system than the
right to trial by jury.”129 Courts addressing this particular issue130
should follow the same lead, recognizing a narrow exception131 for
cases brought by a plaintiff-insurer “in admiralty” under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, ultimately granting a defendantinsured’s demand for a jury trial while allowing the case to proceed
in a federal district court.

127. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved . . . .”).
128. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 1937)
(“[I]t is clear that the right of jury trial in what is essentially an action at law
may not be denied a litigant merely because his adversary has asked that the
controversy be determined under the declaratory procedure.”).
129. 184 F.R.D. 258, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
130. This issue is limited to this proposed exception to declaratory
judgment actions, not the broader “hybrid cases” that include multiple claims
for damages with independent jurisdictional bases.
131. A broader exception would address the right to a jury trial in “hybrid
cases,” and that issue does not have to be resolved in order to create the
proposed exception set forth in this Comment.

